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The property settlement pursuant to divorce often involves the transfer
of property from one spouse to the other. Such a transfer may be made in
lieu of periodic alimony or support payments. Alternatively, the transfer
may be made to effect an actual division of property owned legally or
equitably by both spouses. In the case of the transfer of appreciated
property- that with a fair market value at time of transfer greater than its
basis- the tax consequences to either spouse can vary greatly, depending
on the character of the transfer.
Section 1002 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) requires recogni-
tion of the gain from the sale or other disposition of property. The amount
of gain is determined by the excess of the amount realized upon disposition
over the adjusted basis of the property (I.R.C. section 1011). The Internal
Revenue Service has taxed as a capital gain (I.R.C. section 1221) the in-
crease in value of appreciated property which is transferred by one spouse
to the other if the primary motivation for the transfer was the fulfillment of
an alimony or support obligation. The Service's theory is that although the
transferor receives no money in exchange for the transfer under a property
settlement, he does receive a release of the alimony or support obligation in
consideration for the transfer. This constitutes an exchange of property,
and the transferor therefore receives the full economic benefit of the ap-
preciated value of the property and must recognize the amount of ap-
preciation as a capital gain. However, if the motivation for the transfer is
the division of jointly-owned property, the Service does not tax the increase
in value as a capital gain. The theory is that such a transfer merely sets
aside to each spouse what he or she already owns. Thus, there is no disposi-
tion under I.R.C. section 1001(a) and therefore no taxable event.
The Missouri Divorce Reform Act,' which became effective on
January 1, 1974, requires the court to divide the spouses' property in the
event of divorce. This comment will consider the character of interspousal
transfers of property pursuant to a dissolution decree under the new Act. 2
1. RSMo §§ 452.300-.415 (Supp. 1975).
2. This comment will discuss only transfers of separately titled property
deemed to be marital property under the Missouri Divorce Reform Act. There
are related issues which will confront attorneys dealing with marriage dissolution
and the subsequent tax problems. Among these are 1) the presumption that title
indicates ownership; 2) the presumption that contribution to the acquisition of
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If such a transfer is made to fulfill a support obligation the transferor can
expect to recognize as a capital gain the amount the property has ap-
preciated. On the other hand, if the transfer is made to divide co-owned
property, i. e., each spouse acquires separate title to property in which he
or she already has an ownership interest, there will be no recognition of a
capital gain at the time of transfer.
II. PROPERTY LAW IN COMMON LAW AND COMMUNITY
PROPERTY JURISDICTIONS
Two separate systems of property tax exist in the United States: the
common law system and the community property system. The tax conse-
quences of property transfers upon dissolution of marriage depend on
whether the spouses are subject to the law of a common law jurisdiction or
a community property jurisdiction. Because it is arguable that Missouri's
Divorce Reform Act incorporates characteristics of both common law and
community property law, it is necessary to explore the nature of the
spouses' property rights in each type of jurisdiction prior to a discussion of
the tax consequences of a property transfer.
A. The Common Law Property System
In a common law jurisdiction3 the spouses may hold property jointly or
each spouse may hold his or her own property alone, or separately. 4 If the
spouses choose, they may title the property acquired during the marriage
in both their names as joint tenants, as tenants by the entirety, or as
tenants in common. Property acquired during the marriage also may be
titled solely in the name of one spouse. Property acquired prior to
marriage may be maintained as the separate property of the spouse who
property must be monetary, which makes it difficult for the non-wage earning
spouse to prove that he gave a portion of the consideration to acquire property
titled in the name of the wage earning spouse by contribution to the development
of the family resources; 3) the fact that the major cases in this area involved trans-
fers from the husband to the wife where there is a legally recognized duty to sup-
port the wife (query whether a transfer from the wife to the husband in the
absence of a legal duty to support would case a different result); and 4) the
presumption of the tax law that the wife need recognize no gain on the transfer of
her marital rights to the husband, even though her basis in those rights is zero and
her gain is actually the full fair market value of the marital rights (held to be
equal to the fair market value of the property received in exchange there for). See
note 23 infra.
3. These include all states except Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana,
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas and Washington, which are community property
jurisdictions.
4. Prior to the passage of the Married Women's Property Acts, a woman
did not have the right to maintain a separate estate. The situation prior to the
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acquired it, or it may be transferred to one of the forms of joint,
ownership.'
In the absence of statutory modification, upon divorce in a commoni
law jurisdiction each spouse retains his or her own separately-titled prop-[
erty, regardless of when it was acquired. A tenancy by the entireties or!
joint tenancy becomes a tenancy in common, which is then subject to a
partition suit. Alimony is commonly awarded to the wife. If there is
statutory authority, the court may order the transfer of part of the hus-
band's property to the wife instead of, or in addition to, a requirement that.
he make periodic alimony payments. 6
In a common law state, if there is a transfer of separately-titled proper-
ty pursuant to divorce, the Service will require recognition of the apprecia-
tion as a capital gain, regardless of whether the property was acquired
prior to or during the marriage. The transferee is deemed to have no
ownership rights in the separate property of the transferor, and thus the
transfer must have been made in satisfaction of a marital obligation such
as support, or in lieu of dower or a statutory forced share. By satisfying the
obligation with the transfer of appreciated property, the transferor utilizes
the fair market value of the property and there is a disposition within the
meaning of I.R.C. section 1001. The same analysis applies to an uneven
division of the jointly held property because it is presumed that each
spouse is entitled to half of the property. If there is no transfer of separate
property, or if the jointly-titled property is divided equally, no disposition
occurs; each spouse retains his or her own property with no immediate tax
consequences.
B. The Community Property System
The property law in the eight community property states7 provides
that each spouse can maintain as a separate estate all the property which
he acquired before the marriage. The property acquired during the mar-
riage is generally held to be community property, which belongs equally to
both spouses, no matter how it is titled. In the event of divorce, each
spouse retains his separate property, and the community property is divid-
ed between the spouses. 8
5. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 224-25 (1968) (presumptions and rules of law and equity regarding inter-
spousal transfers).
6. RSMo §§ 452.010-.250 (1969). In Missouri there was no statutory
authority for a court to order the husband to transfer some of his separate estate
to the wife as part of a property division. This is a significant difference between
the old and new Missouri laws. Cases decided before 1974 have little relevance on
the issue of property division. See H. CLARK, supra note 5, at 420-52, for a
general discussion of alimony and property division in common law jurisdictions.
7. See note 3 supra.
8. Although it is commonly thought that the division of community prop-
erty must be equal, this is not the case in Arizona and Texas. ARIZ. REV. ST.
[Vol. 44
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There is no tax assessed if each marital asset (community property) is
divided equally or if the total of all the marital assets is divided equally.
The presumption of the Service is that each spouse receives what was his to
begin with, i.e., one-half of the marital property. If there is an unequal
division of marital property or if separate property is exchanged, there is a
potential for capital gain recognition. In these situations is is presumed
that one spouse has sold his or her property to the other, qualifying the
transfer as a disposition under I.R.C. section 1001.
C. The Deferred Community Property System
There is now a third type of system, 9 which might be called "deferred
community property," in a few states formerly considered to be common
law jurisdictions. Prior to the initiation of an action for dissolution, de-
ferred community property theory is similar to common law theory; dur-
ing the marriage each spouse controls his or her separately-titled property
and together the spouses control the jointly-titled property. In a common
law jurisdiction, a spouse has no ownership interest in property acquired
during the marriage but titled in the name of the other spouse. However,
at the dissolution of marriage, deferred community property theory
resembles the property law in the community property states. In a deferred
community property jurisdiction, upon the filing of a petition for dissolu-
tion an ownership interest in separately-titled property acquired during
the marriage vests in the nontitled spouse. Such property is "marital prop-
erty." Upon dissolution, either the court or the spouses in a property settle-
ment agreement will divide what is marital property in a manner provided
by law. Equal division between the spouses is not required. This is similar
to property division in some community property states.10 The system dif-
fers from those in common law jurisdictions in which courts have statutory
authority to award some of the husband's property to the wife as part of his
alimony obligation. In a deferred community jurisdiction, the property
division is mandatory and does not depend on the wife's need for support;
each spouse has an absolute right to the division of property.
Deferred community property theory is a hybrid of common law and
community property theories. The common law theory of management
§ 25-318 (West 1976); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Vernon ,1975). An equal
division is mandatory in Louisiana and New Mexico. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. arts.
155, 159, 2406 (West 1971 & Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-7-6 (Supp.
1975). Idaho permits unequal division in favor of the innocent spouse in some cir-
cumstances, e.g., adultery or extreme cruelty. IDAHO CODE § 32-712 (Supp.
1977). See W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
514-16 (2d ed. 1971).
9. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26, 27, mentions three'theories under
which property can be divided: community property theory, common law theory,
and a theory referred to as "similar to community property law."
10. See note 8 supra.
1979]
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and control of property governs up to the beginning of the dissolution pro-
ceeding; from that point on, community property theory controls. In
states recognized as deferred community property jurisdictions, the tax
consequences of transfers of marital property pursuant to a divorce decree
are the same as in a community property state. If the property acquired
during the marriage is divided between the spouses equally, it is presumed
that no disposition occurs; the transferor does not recognize the apprecia-
tion of the transferred property as a capital gain. However, if there is an
unequal division of marital property, there is the potential for capital gain
recognition by the transferor, as under community property law.
Colorado and Oklahoma became deferred community property juris-
dictions through the development of case law. In addition, in 1971 the
Colorado legislature adopted the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act."
Missouri adopted a slightly modified version of the Uniform Act in 1974.12
In jurisdictions like Missouri, formerly common law jurisdictions for pur-
poses of division of property at divorce, the passage of the Uniform Act has
significantly changed the property rights of spouses at the time of dissolu-
tion. Whether passage of the Uniform Act has made Missouri a deferred
community property jurisdiction for tax purposes will be examined below.
III. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAX LAW
To evaluate the tax consequences for a Missouri resident involved in a
property settlement upon dissolution of marriage after 1974, it is necessary
to review the situations in which the Service has taxed similar transfers in
other jurisdictions. It is also necessary to understand the cases which, for
the purpose of property division upon dissolution of marriage, marked
some states as common law jurisdictions and others, including Colorado
and Oklahoma, as deferred community property states. The cases are ex-
amined in chronological order. Following this examination, Missouri law
will be compared to these jurisdictions.
Until 1960 there was no discord among the appellate courts concern-
ing the tax consequences of property transfers at divorce in common law
jurisdictions. The Third Circuit held in 1941 that if separate property of
the husband was transferred by him to the wife in fulfillment of an obliga-
tion to support her, the husband realized a capital gain. 13 The court held
that the amount of gain was to be determined by the excess of the fair
market value of the property at the date of the transfer over the basis of the
property. A similar decision was reached by the Second Circuit in 1942.14
11. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 14-2-101 to 14-2-113, 14-10-101 to 14-10-133
(1973 & Supp. 1976).
12. RSMo §§ 452.300-.415 (Supp. 1975).
13. Commissioner v. Mesta, 123 F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1941) (the wife released
her alimony and dower rights under Pennsylvania law).
14. Commissioner v. Halliwell, 131 F.2d 642, 643 (2d Cir. 1942). Under
Connecticut law, an agreement reached by the spouses and the findings of the
[Vol. 44
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In 1960, however, the Sixth Circuit held that, although a gain had oc-
curred, it was not possible to ascertain the amount of the gain. 15 The court
said that the language of I.R.C. section 1001(b) required that the gain be
determined by the fair market value of the property received, i.e., the
release of the spouse's right to support, 16 less the basis of the property
transferred, not by the fair market value of the property transferred less
the basis of the property transferred. The court said that it was not possible
to determine the fair market value of the spouse's right to support and thus
no tax could be assessed. In view of the disagreement among the circuits
and the Court of Claims, the Supreme Court agreed to hear United States
v. Davis. 17
Davis arose out of a Delaware divorce action. The husband transferred
to his wife certain separately-titled shares of stock pursuant to a property
settlement prior to divorce. 18 In return, the wife released all claims against
the husband. The husband was assessed a capital gain on the appreciation
of the stock. The Supreme Court rejected the husband's argument that
"the present disposition is comparable to a nontaxable division of property
between two co-owners."' 9 The Court said that the inchoate rights of the
wife in the separately-titled property of the husband did not reach the level
of co-ownership under Delaware law. The wife could not manage or
dispose of the property, her rights were not descendible, she had to survive
the husband in order to share in his estate, and she shared in the property
upon divorce only to the extent that the court deemed reasonable. 20 Find-
ing that the Delaware dissolution statute "seems only to place a burden on
the husband's property rather than to make the wife a part owner
thereof,"21 the Court went on to hold that the amount of gain realized by
the husband was ascertainable because "the values 'of the two properties
exchanged in an arms-length transaction are equal in fact, or are presum-
ed to be equal.' "22 In other words, the gain was to be determined by the
divorce court indicated that the property was transferred "as alimony and in full
of his obligation for the support of said minor child").
15. Commissioner v. Marshman, 279 F.2d 27 (6th Cir. 1960) (under Ohio
law).
16. Id. at 32. The property received by the husband was the release of the
wife's rights to maintenance, support and a share in the husband's estate in the
event of his death.
17. 370 U.S. 65 (1962).
18. Id. at 66. The case does not indicate whether the shares were acquired
prior to or during the marriage.
19. Id. at 69.
20. Id. at 70. "[T]he wife shall be allowed out of her husband's real estate,
personal estate, or both, such share as the court deems reasonable." DEL. LAws,
c. 221, §§ 15, 16 (1906-07) (currently codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §
1527(a) (1.974)).
21. 370 U.S. at 70.
22. Id. at 72, citing Philadelphia Park Amusement Park Co. v. United
States, 126 F. Supp. 184, 189 (Ct. Cl. 1954).
1979]
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amount of the appreciation of the transferred property. 23 This rule
prevailed in common law jurisdictions24 until 1969 when the Tenth Circuit
finally disposed of Collins v. Commissioner.2-
When the Tenth Circuit originally heard Collins,26 that court followed
Davis and imposed a deficiency on the husband following the transfer of
shares of stock to his wife at the termination of their marriage. At the same
time as he challenged the federal tax deficiency, Collins also challenged
the Oklahoma state income tax deficiency imposed for the same reason.
The United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the case but remanded27
in light of the ruling of the Oklahoma Supreme Court that, under Okla-
homa law, the wife has a species of common ownership in property
acquired during the marriage but titled in the husband's name. 28 On re-
mand the Tenth Circuit said: "Just as the Court in Davis, we seek to deter-
mine whether, under state law, the present transfer more nearly resembles
a nontaxable division of property between co-owners, or whether it is a
taxable transfer in exchange for the release of an independent obliga-
tion."2 9 The court rejected the position of the Commissioner that Davis
had established federal criteria to determine whether the wife's interest
constituted co-ownership under state law.30 The court stated that there
was no need to search the state law for indications of other factors because
the Oklahoma Supreme Court had defined the nature of the wife's prop-
23. Rev. Rul. 67-221, 1967-2 C.B. 63, established the rule that the wife does
not realize a gain on the property she transfers to her husband, i.e., her rights to
support. However, her basis in "her rights" is zero and theoretically her gain is
easily ascertainable-the fair market value of the property received minus a zero
basis. In view of the fact that all cases in this area involve a property transfer by
the husband and a release of marital rights by the wife, there seems to be an in-
consistent application of the requirement of recognition of a capital gain.
24. Davis hasbeen followed in McKinny v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 263
(1975) (a West Virginia divorce); Wright v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 377 (1974) (a
Wisconsin divorce); Kraut v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. Wis. 1970) (a
Wisconsin divorce). See also King v. Commissioner, 31 T.C. 108 (1958) (an
Oregon divorce).
25. 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
26. 388 F.2d 353 (10th Cir. 1968).
27. 393 U.S. 215 (1968).
28. Collins v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 446 P.2d 290 (Okla. 1968). OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1977), provides:
As to such property, whether real or personal, as shall have been ac-
quired by the parties jointly during their marriage, whether the title
thereto be in either or both of said parties, the court shall make such divi-
sion between the parties as may appear just and reasonable, by a division
of the property in kind, or by setting the same apart to one of the parties,
and requiring the other thereof to pay such sum as may be just and
proper to effect a fair and just division thereof.
29. 412 F.2d at 212.
30. Id. See text accompanying notes 20-22 supra.
[Vol. 44
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erty interest.3 1 Collins was the first recognition of the position which has
been called deferred community property. 2
In 1971 the Eighth Circuit in Wallace v. United States33 rejected the
husband's contention that the transfer of stock incident to divorce in Iowa
was a division of property between equitable co-owners.3 4 The court found
that under the Iowa divorce statute35 "the property rights of the wife in
Iowa [more] closely parallel those of a wife in Delaware [than those of a
wife in Oklahoma], i. e., she possesses only inchoate rights in her husband's
property. ' 36 Wallace thus identified Iowa as a common law jurisdiction.
This Eighth Circuit case must be considered in examining the Missouri
position. There are two significant points. First, under the Missouri
statute, most of the property involved in Wallace would be considered to
be the separate property of the husband rather than marital property,
because it was received by him as a gift from his parents.3 7 Second, as will
be discussed in part IV infra, Missouri law is distinguishable from Iowa
and Delaware law.
In 1974 the Tenth Circuit again addressed the Davis issue in its con-
sideration of a case arising under Kansas law.3 8 The spouses in Wiles v.
31. 412 F.2d at 212.
32. In 1961, the Service had argued in Swanson v. Wiseman that the wife's
basis in property transferred to her upon divorce was equal to the original acqui-
sition cost of the property. The argument was that because Oklahoma recognizes
that jointly acquired property belongs equally to both spouses, the wife received
the property in the division of the marital property and not in fulfillment of a
marital obligation owed to her by her husband, and therefore her basis was not
increased to the fair market value as of the date of transfer. Swanson v. Wiseman,
61-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 9264 (W.D. Okla. 1961).
In 1970 and 1971 the Service disallowed alimony deductions to two Oklahoma
taxpayers who argued unsuccessfully that payments to a former spouse were in
fulfillment of marital obligations. The Service argued that the payments were in
exchange for the marital property transferred to the husband from the wife, and
that the husband was purchasing the wife's share of the marital property and thus
no deduction was allowed for alimony. Mills v. Commissioner, 442 F.2d 1149
(10th Cir. 1971); Jackson v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 125 (1970) (citing Collins).
The Service took the opposite view and lost in Nell Mills v. United States, 67-2
U.S. Tax Cas. 9575 (N.D. Okla. 1967).
33. 439 F.2d 757 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 831 (1971).
34. Id. at 759.
35. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West 1970) (formerly § 598.14) provides:
"When a dissolution of marriage is decreed, the court may make such order on
relation to the children, property, parties and maintenance of the parties as shall
be justified."
36. 439 F.2d at 760.
37. RSMo § 452.330.2(1) (Supp. 1975) excludes from marital property that
which is acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent. For a list of the property in-
volved and its source, see Wallace v. United States, 309 F. Supp. 749, 755 (S.D.
Iowa 1970).
38. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (1976) provides:
The decree shall divide the real and personal property of the parties,
whether owned by either spouse prior to marriage, acquired by either
19791
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United States39 had attempted an equal division of their combined prop-
erty. To effectuate an equal division, the husband agreed to transfer some
of his property to the wife because the value of his property exceeded hers.
The opinion does not indicate how or when the transferred property was
acquired. Although Kansas' dissolution statute is almost identical to the
Oklahoma statute considered in Collins,40 the court reached an opposite
result and held that the transfer was taxable. The Kansas statute can be
distinguished from the Oklahoma statute in that the Kansas trial court has
the power to divide any property owned by either spouse regardless of
when it was acquired. The Oklahoma statute allows division only of prop-
erty acquired during the marriage. The Tenth Circuit looked to Kansas
statutes and case law4 ' because there was no definitive Kansas Supreme
Court decision in point.
Imel v. United States42 concerned the transfer of stock by the husband
to the wife upon dissolution of marriage. Imel arose under the 1963 Col-
orado divorce statute, 43 but Colorado, like Missouri, subsequently enacted
a version of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. 44 The federal district
spouse in his or her own right after marriage, or acquired by their joint
efforts, in a just and reasonable manner, either by division of the prop-
erty in kind, or by setting the same or part thereof over to one of the
spouses and requiring either to pay such sum as may be just and proper,
or by ordering a sale .... (emphasis added).
39. 499 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1974).
40. Compare the Oklahoma statute, supra note 28, with the Kansas statute,
supra note 38.
41. Folkv. Folk, 203 Kan. 576, 455 P.2d 487 (1969); Harrahv. Harrah, 196
Kan. 142, 409 P.2d 1007 (1966).
42. 375 F. Supp. 1102 (D. Colo. 1974), aff'd, 523 F.2d 853(10th Cir. 1975).
43. At the time of the issuance of a divorce decree, or at some reason-
able time thereafter as may be set by the court at the time of the issuance
of the divorce decree, . . . the court may make such orders, if any, as the
circumstances of the case may warrant relative to division of property, in
such proportions as may be fair and equitable.
44. COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1971) provides:
(1) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage... the court shall set
apart to each spoue his property and shall divide the marital property as
the court deems just after considering all relevant factors including:
(a) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital
property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(b) The value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(c) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division
of property is to become effective, including the desirability of awarding
the family home or the right to live iherein for reasonable periods to the
spouse having custody of any children; and
(d) Any increases or decreases in the value of the separate property of
the spouse during the marriage or the depletion of the separate property
for marital purposes.
(2) For purposes of this article only, "marital property" means all prop-
erty acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage except:
[Vol. 44100
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court certified the questions of the wife's interest in separately-titled prop-
erty of the husband acquired during the marriage to the Colorado
Supreme Court. 45 That court stated that, under both the 1963 statute and
the subsequently enacted Uniform Act, "at the time the divorce action was
filed there vested in the wife her interest in the property in the name of the
husband." 46 The Tenth Circuit later affirmed that such transfer in Col-
orado was a nontaxable division of co-owned property, 47 overruling an
earlier decision. 48 Imel's importance is not only that it concerned the
Uniform Act, but that the court concluded that the opinion of the state
supreme court regarding the nontitled spouse's interest in separately-titled
property was binding on the federal courts.
IV. THE SITUATION IN MISSOURI
The preceding examination of cases reveals the criteria that govern the
tax consequences of interspousal transfers of property at dissolution. In
deciding whether a jurisdiction is a common law or a deferred community
property jurisdiction, federal courts examine three factors. The first is
whether there is a state supreme court decision which defines the rights of
the spouses in property acquired during the marriage. If no such decision
exists, the state's property law is examined to see what rights it bestows on
the spouses. If it is determined that these rights do not rise to the level of
co-ownership, the state's dissolution statute is next examined to deter-
mine whether it has changed the property law to provide for co-ownership
(a) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;(b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to mar-
riage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or
descent;
(c) Property acquired after a decree of legal separation;
(d) Property excluded by a valid agreement of the parties.
(3) All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage
and prior to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital prop-
erty, regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in
some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
tenancy by the entirety, and community property. The presumption of
marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was ac-
quired by a method listed in subsection (2) of this section.
(4) An asset of a spouse acquired prior to the marriage or in accordance
with subsection (2)(a) or (2)(b) of this section shall be considered as
marital property, for purposes of this article only, to the extent that its
present value exceeds its value at the time of the marriage or at the time
of acquisition if acquired after marriage.(5) For purposes of this section only, property shall be valued as of the
date of the decree or as of the date of the hearing on disposition of prop-
erty if such hearing precedes the date of the decree.
45. 375 F. Supp. at 1116.
46. In Re Questions, 517 P.2d 1331, 1332 (Colo. 1974).
47. Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853, 857 (10th Cir. 1975).
48. Pulliam v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1964).
1979]
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of marital property. It is clear that the federal courts regard a decision by
the state supreme court as controlling, and if there is such a decision, no
examination of property and dissolution law will be conducted.4 9 Because
Missouri has no such supreme court decision, it is necessary to compare
Missouri's property law and dissolution statute to those of the common law
and deferred community property jurisdictions discussed above to assess
the tax consequences for Missourians.
A. Missouri Law Prior to 1974
Prior to 1974, Missouri was a common law jurisdiction for tax pur-
poses. Under Missouri's property law, it is clear that one spouse had no
ownership rights in the property of the other, as was true in all examined
jurisdictions. In Delaware, Iowa, Kansas, Colorado, and Oklahoma, as in
Missouri, each spouse held his own property separately 0 There was no
right to share in the management of the other spouse's property. 1 The
estate of the nontitled spouse had no right to share in the property of the
titled spouse unless the nontitled spouse survived.5 2 The only right given by
Missouri property law was that of dower or forced share and this necessi-
tated survival.
Missouri divorce law prior to 1974 gave no co-ownership rights to the
nontitled spouse. Although alimony could be awarded to the wife,5 3 there
was no statutory power enabling the court to divide property or order
property transferred from one spouse to the other, even to satisfy a support
obligation imposed on the husband. 54 Each spouse retained his or her own
separate property, i.e., that which was titled in his or her own name,
regardless of when it was acquired. Property held by the spouses as tenants
by the entirety was converted at divorce into property held as tenants in
common. 5  The spouses often entered into property settlement agreements
in which they contracted for transfers of property, payment of alimony,
child support and custody, and attorney's fees and tax treatment.56
Because neither the property law nor the divorce law gave the nontitled
spouse any interest in property acquired during the marriage, prior to
1974 the Missouri spouse would be treated like the petitioner in Davis.
49. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Imel v. United States, 523
F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975); Collins v. United States, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969).
50. RSMo § 451.250 (1969).
51. H. CLARK, supra note 5, at 219-26.
52. RSMo §§ 474.160, .010 (1969).
53. RSMo § 452.070 (1969).
54. McDougal v. McDougal, 279 S.W.2d 731 (Spr. Mo. App. 1955); Bishop
v. Bishop, 151 S.W.2d 553 (St. L. Mo. App. 1941).
55. McIntyre v. McIntyre, 377 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. 1964); Allan v. Allan, 364
S.W.2d 578 (Mo. 1963); Reed v. Reed, 516 S.W.2d 568 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1974).
56. Comment, Separation Agreements, 21 Mo. L. REV. 286 (1956).
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B. Missouri Law After Enactment of the
Divorce Reform Act
Missouri property law regarding the interests of spouses has not
changed since 1974. It continues to be similar to the property law of Dela-
ware, Iowa, Kansas, Colorado, and Oklahoma. However, the property
division sections of the Missouri Divorce Reform Act are a major departure
from prior divorce law in Missouri.5 7 In the five years the statute has been
in effect, numerous cases on the division of property have come before the
Missouri Court of Appeals.5" However, none have directly addressed the
57. Section 452.330, RSMo (Supp. 1975) provides in part:
1. [T]he court shall set apart to each spouse his property and shall divide
the marital property in such proportions as the court deems just after
considering all relevant factors including:(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the marital
property, including the contribution of a spouse as homemaker;
(2) The value of the property set apart to each spouse;
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the divi-
sion of property is to become effective, including the desirability of
awarding the family home or the right to live therein for reasonable
periods to the spouse having custody of any children; and(4) The conduct of the spouses during the marriage.
2. '[M]arital property' means all property acquired by either spouse
subsequent to the marriage except:
(1) Property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or descent;
(2) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired prior to
marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise or
descent;(3) Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation;
(4) Property excluded by valid agreement of the parties; and(5) The increase in value of property acquired prior to the marriage.
3. All property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage
and prior to a decree of legal separation is presumed to be marital prop-
erty regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in
some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common,
tenancy by the entirety, and community property. The presumption of
marital property is overcome by showing that the property was acquired
by a method listed in subsection 2.
4. The court's order as it affects distribution of marital property shall be
a final order not subject to modification.
58. The opinions have not specified who had title to the property or which
spouse gave the consideration for the property. If the property is found to be
marital within the statutory definition, then it is subject to division. If the prop-
erty is found not to be marital, it is set aside as the separate property of the appro-
priate spouse. The courts have not made further analysis of the ownership
interests of the spouses.
Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976) does discuss these
issues in characterizing contested property as marital or separate. The same issues
are not discussed regarding two other pieces of property, titled solely in the hus-
12
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issue of spouses' ownership rights in separately-titled property acquired
during the marriage. Only one case has discussed the nature of the prop-
erty rights of the spouses. In Corder v. Corder59 the trial court failed to
divide the marital property which was held by the spouses as tenants by the
entirety. On appeal the husband challenged any division of this property
other than on an equal basis on the ground that it would be an unconstitu-
tional deprivation of property without due process.60 In rejecting this
claim, the court had this to say about the purpose of the new statute:
Public policy sought to be served by Section 452.330, supra, is
multi-faceted and self-evident. Previously, the contributions of a
wife regarding the accumulation of property during the marriage
relation, either in the sense of direct financial contribution or in
the sense of indirect contributions by her services as a homemaker,
were largely ignored. Regarding property accumulated during the
marriage relation and held in the husband's name alone, a wife,
even though an innocent and injured party, upon the severance of
the marriage had only the concept of alimony (subject to termina-
tion on remarriage of the wife or the death of the husband, or
future reduction occasioned by the husband's diminished finan-
cial ability), tenuous at best, to which to turn. Regarding property
accumulated duing marriage and held by the husband and wife
as tenants by the entirety, the respective contributions of the
spouses, whether direct or indirect in nature were of no moment
whatsoever, and their rights and interests in such property were
regimented by operation of law. Upon termination of the marriage
relation, fixing the rights and interests of a wife and husband in
such property by operation of law, due to its inherent inflexibility,
made it impossible to accommodate any consideration of what
might be a just or fair division.
A goal or evident purpose of the Dissolution of Marriage Act was to
eliminate, or in any event minimize, many of the anachronistic
vestiges which surrounded rights to property acquired during mar-
riage in the event the marriage relation was severed. As opposed to
the old order, the Dissolution of Marriage Act views the acquisi-
tion of "marital property" as a partnership endeavor, and it enun-
ciates a standard for dividing such property which is flexible
enough to weigh and balance the respective contributions of the
band's name, which were acquired during the marriage and thus were marital
property.
The court in Nixon v. Nixon, 525 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975)
divided $260,000 of marital property with a discussion of the nature of only$55,000 of this amount. The court in In re Marriage of Powers, 527 S.W.2d 949
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975) divided over $197,000 worth of marital property.
Again the issues discussed centered on a determination of whether various items
of property were marital or separate.
59. 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
60. Id. at 802.
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spouses and to accommodate consideration of manifest justness
and fairness. 61
In view of the failure of the cases to specify the property rights of the
spouses, it is necessary to examine the provisions of the Act to determine
what rights are granted to the spouses and how the Act's provisions com-
pare to those of the jurisdictions examined above.
A person filing a petition for dissolution in Missouri may also request
an injunction to prevent the disposal of any property held by his spouse. 62
This is the same procedure the Colorado court found to indicate the
vesting of the spouses' interests in all property acquired during the mar-
riage. 63 The right to the injunction is an exercise of control over the prop-
erty consistent with the theory that absolute property rights vest in the
nontitled spouse at the time the petition for dissolution is filed.
The Missouri statute also provides for a mandatory division of the
spouses' property. 64 Although the court has discretion as to the amount of
each share, the spouses have an absolute right to the division. This is also
the rule in the deferred community property states of Colorado65 and
Oklahoma. 66 In Delaware and Iowa (both common law states) property
division is discretionary with the court. 67 Although the Kansas statute pro-
vides for mandatory division, it also provides for the division of what would
be nonmarital property in Missouri, i.e., property acquired prior to mar-
riage or by gift or devise. 68
Permissive division does not recognize a co-ownership theory; the ab-
solute discretion of the court indicates that nontitled spouses have no ab-
solute rights in separately-titled property acquired during marriage. The
spouses have only those rights which the court may choose to award. On
the other hand, the requirement of mandatory division is a recognition
that nontitled spouses do have ownership rights in the marital property.
Because action of the court is necessary to transfer title to the spouse who
has an ownership interest but does not hold title, the statute requires that
the court make a disposition of the property at dissolution. The Kansas
statute, even though it requires a mandatory division, is distinguishable
because of its provision for the division of nonmarital property. Even the
true community property jurisdictions recognize no ownership right of the
61. Id. at 803-04 (emphasis added).
62. RSMo § 452.315.2(1) (Supp. 1975).
63. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
64. RSMo §§ 452.330.1, .330 (Supp. 1975); L.F.H. v. R.L.H., 543 S.W.2d
520 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976); Pendleton v. Pendleton, 532 S.W.2d 905 (Mo.
App., D. Spr. 1976).
65. In re Questions, 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974); Shapiro v. Shapiro, 115
Colo. 505, 176 P.2d 363 (1946).
66. West v. West, 268 P.2d 250 (Okla. 1954); Van Horn v. Van Horn, 119
P.2d 825 (Okla. 1941).
67. See notes 20 & 35 supra.
68. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (1976).
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nontitled spouse in nonmarital property. Thus, a division of such property
could only be to satisfy an obligation of support; the nontitled spouse, even
under community property theory, cannot have any ownership rights
therein.
The court order regarding property division in Missouri is final and
not subject to modification. 69 This is recognition of a co-ownership theory;
changing factors which may be relevant in a decision to increase or
decrease maintenance or child support are not relevant to a decision as to
what the parties own individually at the time of dissolution. Thus, once the
ownership interests of the spouses are determined at the time of dissolu-
tion, subsequent conditions are irrelevant, and modification of the prop-
erty division would be unnecessary.
A consideration which could be said to militate against the absolute
ownership theory in Missouri is the dissolution statute's listing of factors to
be considered by the court in dividing marital property. 70 The use of such
factors could indicate that ownership is not absolute but depends on the
court's assessment of the parties' needs. However, the argument can be
made that use of these factors does not mean that ownership does not exist
but merely helps the court determine what portion of the marital property
each spouse owns. It has also been held 7 that the fact that the case law of
Delaware,7 2 Iowa, 73 and Kansas74 require the use of such factors weighs
against joint ownership, but Colorado 5 and Oklahoma 76 also consider
such factors in dividing marital property and this use did not defeat a joint
ownership theory in those states.77 In addition, two community property
69. RSMo § 452".330.4 (Supp. 1975).
70. See note 57 supra; Cornell v. Cornell, 550 S.W.2d 823 (Mo. App., D.
Spr. 1977); Schulte v. Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977); Inre the
Marriage of B. K. S., 535 S.W.2d 534 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976); Vanet v. Vanet,
544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1976).
71. Wiles v. United States, 499 F.2d 255, 257 (10th Cir. 1974); Wallace v.
United States, 439 F.2d 757, 760 (8th Cir. 1971); 309 F. Supp. 748, 759 (S.D.
Iowa 1970). These cases are based on United States v. Davis, 370 U.S. 65, 70
(1960).
72. Beres v. Beres, 52 Del. 133, 154 A.2d 384 (1959).
73. Pfab v. Pfab, 132 N.W.2d 483 (Iowa 1965); Rider v. Rider, 105
N.W.2d 508 (Iowa 1960); Dillavou v. Dillavou, 17 N.W.2d 393 (Iowa 1945);
Twombley v. Twombley, 287 N.W. 841 (Iowa 1939).
74. Folkv. Folk, 203 Kan. 576, 455 P.2d 487 (1969); Harrahv. Harrah, 196
Kan. 142, 409 P.2d 1007 (1966); Mann v. Mann, 136 Kan. 331, 15 P.2d 478
(1932).
75. Kraus v. Kraus, 159 Colo. 331, 411 P.2d 240 (1966); Nunemacher v.
Nunemacher, 132 Colo. 300, 287 P.2d 663 (1955).
76. Marcus v. Marcus, 214 P.2d 899 (Okla. 1950); Van Horn v. Van Horn,
119 P.2d 825 (Okla. 1941); Dresser v. Dresser, 22 P.2d 1012 (Okla. 1933); Tobin
v. Tobin, 89 Okla. 12, 213 P. 884 (1923).
77. Imel v. United States, 523 F.2d 853 (10th Cir. 1975); Collins v. Commis-
sioner, 412 F.2d 211 (10th Cir. 1969). Although neither opinion refers specifically
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states which recognize ownership by both spouses of all community prop-
erty permit the unequal division of the property upon divorce based on
similar factors. 78
The Missouri Act also distinguishes between maintenance and prop-
erty division. A property transfer pursuant to a finding that maintenance
is required is clearly a transfer in exchange for the release of a support obli-
gation; these transfers are covered by a separate statutory provision. 79
However, even if there is no showing of need for maintenance, the court is
required by the property division section to divide the marital property.
Confusion has arisen in this area because the court order transferring the
property often fails to specify under which section of the statute the
transfer is being made. Such confusion, however, does not defeat the fact
that an order for property division does not depend on any provision con-
cerning the award of maintenance.
An element often utilized to determine the ownership of property is the
source of the consideration. If both parties contribute to the acquisition of
the property, the court may find that joint ownership exists even if the
property is titled in the name of only one party. This concept is embodied
in the "resulting trust" which Missouri courts will raise under certain con-
ditions in favor of a contributing spouse.80 Section 452.315.1(1), RSMo
(Supp. 1975) clearly states that in addition to monetary contributions
toward the acquisition of marital property, the court will consider non-
monetary contributions in determining the percentage of ownership of
each spouse in such property.81 In In re Marriage of Cornell, a case involv-
ing a wage-earner husband and a homemaker wife, the court said: "we
find no disparity in the contribution of [the husband] as the bread winner
and [the wife] as mother and homemaker."8 2 If this new definition of con-
sideration is used, co-ownership of marital property could exist in Missouri
even under traditional concepts. Indeed, the Colorado court analogized
the property interest of a nontitled, contributing spouse under the dissolu-
tion act to the interest found under the resulting trust theory.83 Thus
Missouri property law supports the dissolution statute's recognition that
equitable interests rather than bare legal title are the primary indicators of
ownership.
to this point, the decisions reached are only possible if the use of factors by courts
in dividing property does not defeat the common ownership of the spouses.
78. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 25-318 (1973); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 3.63 (Ver-
non 1975).
79. RSMo § 452.335 (Supp. 1975).
80. Nelson, Purchase Money Resulting Trusts in Land in Missouri, 33 Mo.
L. REV. 552 (1968).
81. See Thompson v. Thompson, 30 Colo. App. 57, 489 P.2d 1062 (1971)
(court explicitly recognized the nonmonetary contribution of the husband to the
wife's property).
82. 550 S.W.2d 823, 827 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977).
83. In re Questions, 517 P.2d 1331, 1335 (Colo. 1974).
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It is clear that, regarding ownership rights granted to the spouses at the
time of divorce, Missouri's Divorce Reform Act more closely resembles the
statutes of Colorado and Oklahoma than those of Delaware, Iowa, or Kan-
sas. An injunction is available to protect the spouses' rights in the marital
property, division of the property is mandatory and not subject to modifi-
cation, a distinct maintenance section exists, and the nonmonetary con-
tribution of a spouse is regarded as consideration. All these provisions
indicate that the rights of the nontitled spouse in marital property are not
inchoate as in Delaware but constitute a species of common ownership.
Although courts have examined both the state property law and the
dissolution law in defining the rights of the spouses in marital property at
time of dissolution, it is urged that such rights should be determined in
Missouri solely by reference to the dissolution law. Missouri's dissolution
statute, by its own terms, changes the property rights of the parties at time
of dissolution. When a petition for divorce is filed, the dissolution law
supersedes the property law as between the spouses. Thus, when property
is transferred pursuant to a dissolution decree the definition of the owner-
ship interests in that property should also come from the dissolution
statute.
V. EQUAL DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY
Even though the government recognizes that each spouse has an
ownership interest in certain property, there will be a taxable event if at
dissolution one spouse transfers to the other more than his or her own in-
terest. The only tax free division of jointly-owned property at dissolution is
an equal division between the spouses. 4 In community property and
deferred community property cases in which the Service has recognized
that the nontitled spouse has an ownership interest in separately-titled.
property, it has insisted that such property be equally divided to avoid pre-
sent tax liability.85 This equal division requirement is based on the com-
munity property doctrine of co-equal ownership between the spouses.
If the titled spouse transfers more than one-half of the marital prop-
erty to the nontitled spouse, the Service will contend that the transferor
sold a portion of his marital property to the other spouse in exchange for a
release of marital rights. A strong argument can be made, especially in
Missouri, that the Service's position is not always correct. The equal divi-
sion requirement assumes that each spouse has a one-half interest in the
marital property at the time of dissolution. This may not be the case. The
Missouri trial court is empowered to divide marital property between the
spouses as the court deems just, considering, among other things, the
relative contributions of each spouse. It therefore can be said that the
84. Rev. Rul. 74-347, 1974-2 C.B. 26.
85. Carrieres v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 959 (1975); Cofield v. Koehler, 207
F. Supp. 73 (D. Kan. 1962).
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ownership interest of each spouse at the time of dissolution is that decreed
by the court, and that such interest might not and probably would not be
exactly one-half. It is questionable whether the Service will accept this
argument in light of its insistence on absolute equal division of marital
property to avoid recognition by the transferor of a capital gain on the ap-
preciation of the property transferred in excess of one-half.
In a common law jurisdiction such as Delaware, it is usually found that
the husband has purchased the release of his marital obligations by trans-
ferring property to his wife. However, the Missouri statute recognizes that
either spouse can have marital obligations to the other, so either spouse
taking a lesser share would be presumed to have sold to the other part of his
or her property in exchange for a release of the other's marital rights.
If a spouse transfers some or all of his or her marital property to the
other in exchange for separate property, whether in kind or in cash, the
transfer is considered a sale. In both of these situations a capital gain must
be recognized if the transferred property has appreciated in value. Where
it is determined that payments are made over a period of years to a spouse
who gave up co-owned property, no deduction for periodic maintenance
payments will be allowed to the purchaser-spouse under I.R.C. section
215; the seller-spouse, however, will recognize only capital gain income
rather than ordinary income under I.R.C. section 71 6
A problem in property settlement may arise in the case of a small
business which cannot be divided between the spouses without certain
damage to the business. A practical solution would be to have one spouse
retain or have transferred to him or her the full interest in the business and
pay a sum of money to the other. As an example, assume that the only
property owned by the spouses is a small business worth $100,000 with a
basis of $70,000. If the business is jointly-titled and both spouses have par-
ticipated in the acquisition and development of the business, it would
clearly be co-owned with each spouse having a $50,000 interest and a
$35,000 basis. If the wife's interest is transferred to the husband at dissolu-
tion and he pays the wife $50,000 over a period of years, the wife must
recognize a $15,000 capital gain. The husband cannot deduct the pay-
ments under section 215. This is considered a sale of property and section
215 is inapplicable because it applies only if periodic payments are made in
fulfillment of marital obligations.8 7 In Missouri this tax treatment pres-
ently applies only if the business is held in a form of joint tenancy.
If the business is titled solely in the husband's name but was acquired
and developed during the marriage, under Missouri law it is marital prop-
86. I.R.C. § 215 generally allows a spouse to deduct amounts paid to a
former spouse if the payments are in the nature of periodic alimony. I.R.C. § 71
requires that periodic payments made by a spouse to a former spouse be included
as ordinary income of the recipient.
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erty. If the court divides the marital property and allocates the business to
the husband and orders him to pay the wife $50,000 over a period of years,
two different tax treatments can result depending on whether the Service
recognizes marital property in Missouri as deferred community property.
If the Service does recognize that marital property is in effect co-owned
property, there would be a sale by the wife to the husband of her interest in
the business. The wife would recognize a $15,000 capital gain and the hus-
band would not be able to deduct the payments under section 215. This is
the same result as occurs with jointly-owned property. However, if the Ser-
vice does not recognize the concept of marital property, there would not be
a sale, but rather a release to the husband of the wife's marital rights in ex-
change for $50,000. The payments would be deductible by the husband as
alimony payments under section 215; the wife would recognize the amount
of the payments as ordinary income under section 71. This situation would
result in increased income to the wife, and a large deduction to the hus-
band.
VI. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Potential tax liability concerning marital property in Missouri arises at
the time of dissolution in either of two situations: if separately-titled ap-
preciated property is transferred pursuant to a dissolution, or if a sum of
money is paid and marital property is retained by one of the spouses. The
parties should negotiate the property settlement giving full consideration
to the tax consequences. The transferor of marital property will want the
transfer to be considered a nontaxable division of co-owned property. If
so, the transferor will not recognize a capital gain on the transfer, but the
transferee will take the property with the transferor's basis. The transferee,
on the other hand, will want the transfer to be considered a taxable ex-
change in fulfillment of the transferor's marital obligations. In this situa-
tion the transferor would recognize a capital gain on the disposition, and
the transferee would take the property with a stepped-up basis equal to the
fair market value of the property at the time of transfer. Thus, the trans-
feree's potential capital gain on subsequent disposition is reduced.
If the marital property is not transferred because division of the prop-
erty is impractical, the spouse who retains the property and pays the other
for his or her share receives an advantage if the payments are considered to
be in fulfillment of marital obligations. Such payments are deductible
under I.R.C. section 215; however, the spouse receiving such payments
must include them as ordinary income under I.R.C. section 71. If pay-
ments are considered to be made to purchase the recipient's share of the
marital property, no deduction is allowed to the purchaser-spouse, but the
seller-spouse must recognize only a capital gain and not ordinary income.
Because there is no Missouri Supreme Court decision on the nature of
the spouses' rights in separately-titled property, attorneys for the parties
should develop evidence in the dissolution suit to support a later tax claim.
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All facts relating to the acquisition of property and the reasons for prop-
erty transfers will be relevant to the tax claim. The attorney may choose to
exercise a spouse's right under RSMo section 452.315.2(1) (Supp. 1975) to
request an injunction to prevent disposition of any marital property. This
may tend to establish the vesting of the nontitled spouse's interest in the
property. The attorney may allege in the pleadings and request the court
to include in the decree whether the transfer is for the maintenance of the
transferee-spouse or is for property division. 8 In an uncontested dissolu-
tion, the attorneys should take care to draft the decree and property settle-
ment to support the negotiated result. This evidentiary foundation will
probably not bind the Service, but may prove helpful if the tax question
arises at a later date.
Although unlikely, it is possible that the Missouri Supreme Court will
define the spouses' rights in separately-titled property acquired during the
marriage. Missouri has no certification procedure whereby the supreme
court could be asked by the federal court to decide the matter. A declara-
tory judgment in state court is also not feasible because there would be no
controversy between the parties; the controversy would be between a
spouse and the Internal Revenue Service and not between the two spouses.
However, there are two situations in which it may be possible to challenge
the Missouri Department of Revenue in a manner which would raise the
issue for decision by the Missouri court. One spouse could refuse to pay
sales tax upon the transfer of title to a motor vehicle or mobile home pur-
suant to a property settlement.8 9 A Missouri taxpayer also could get a
determination of the spouses' property rights by refusing to use the federal
adjusted gross income as the starting point in computing his or her state in-
come taxes.9 0 The taxpayer would argue that the federal adjusted gross
income was inflated by the gain figure resulting from property transferred
at dissolution, which under state law was transferred in a division of prop-
erty and was not sold to the other spouse in exchange for a release of
marital rights. However, the Missouri court may refuse to decide this issue
if it finds that Missouri accepts adjusted gross income as defimed under
federal tax law. A spouse might ask the trial court to include in its divorce
decree a definition of his ownership rights in the transferred property. In
Roberts v. Roberts91 the court of appeals said that the trial court had the
power to designate in its order the spouse who would be entitled to the
88. See Fowler & Krauskopf, Property Provisions, 29 J. Mo. B. 508, 514
(1973). The petition should include a description of the property, status as either
separate or marital property, the source and date of acquisition, evidence regard-
ing the intentions of the parties regarding the property during the marriage, the
use of the property during the marriage, the control of the property during the
marriage, and the nature and source of the consideration given for the property.
89. RSMo § 144.070 (1969).
90. RSMo § 143.121.1 (1969).
91. 553 S.W.2d 305 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
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dependency exemption for the children. 92 The court said that this was
"another factor in the financial relationship between the parties. The
Missouri Divorce Reform Act contemplates courts having jurisdiction over
such matters in order to promote an orderly disposition of the financial
relationship." 93 If the trial court included such a definition in its dissolu-
tion decree, this may be a basis for a review of the issue at the appellate
level.
VII. THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROPOSAL
FOR UNIFORM TAX TREATMENT
The Family Law Section of the American Bar Association has pro-
posed that the tax code be amended to characterize as tax free transfers
between spouses at the time of divorce regardless of jurisdiction.94 There
are three advantages to this proposal: it promotes uniformity and clarity of
the law; it supports the partnership concept of marriage contained in the
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act; and it permits tax deferral until final
disposition of the property by either spouse. With knowledge of the tax
consequences, the spouses and their attorneys would be able to reach set-
tlements at divorce which provide for the most equitable division of the
spouses' property.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Prior to the adoption of Missouri's new dissolution act, and the affir-
mation of Imel by the Tenth Circuit, it was argued that cases in Missouri
should follow Wallace and hold that a transfer of property at time of
divorce was a taxable exchange for the release of marital rights.95 A recent
case in Missouri appellate courts indicates an understanding of the
changed function of the division of marital property in accordance with
the rationale of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act.9 6 It is recognized
that marriage is a partnership with both spouses having ownership interest
in the property accumulated during the marriage.9 7 In many cases the fac-
tors used by the courts to divide the marital property indicate that the
transfers were to divide co-owned property.99 However, there are also cases
92. Id. at 306-07; I.R.C. § 152(e)(2)(A).
93. 553 S.W.2d at 307.
94. ABA FAMILY LAW SECTION COMMITTEE FOR LIASON WITH SECTION OF
TAXATION, ANNUAL REPORT (July 10, 1975).
95. Gunn, The Federal Income Tax Effects of the Missouri Version of the
Uniform Divorce Act, 1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 227.
96. Corder v. Corder, 546 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977).
97. In re Marriage of Neubern, 535 S.W.2d 499 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
98. Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1976); Nixon v. Nix-
on, 525 S.W.2d 835 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1975).
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in which the transfers appear to be as much to provide for the financial in-
dependence of the transferee as to divide the marital assets. 99
The Missouri courts should specify in their orders and opinions the
source of consideration given for property and the state of title, the nature
of the spouses' property rights, and the reasons for the transfer of marital
property. This would enable spouses to prepare for the tax consequences
of property transfers.
The Internal Revenue Service should recognize that the rights in
separately-titled property acquired during the marriage of spouses in
Missouri are the same as those of spouses in Colorado and Oklahoma.
Missouri is now operating as a deferred community property state for pur-
poses of dissolution and its residents should be taxed accordingly.
MARJORIE WHOLEY HAINES
99. In re Marriage of Schulte, 546 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. App., D. Spr. 1977);
Ledbetter v. Ledbetter, 547 S.W.2d 214 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1977).
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